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Abstract
Many applications require control policies that are robust against rare but significant de-
viations, for example caused by hardware failures or adversarial attacks. In this article we
propose a reinforcement learning method that uses a prior belief over potential compro-
misation to learn such a robust policy without requiring observations of the event during
training. Our method can be easily combined with different standard reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms such as Q-learning and Expected SARSA. Experiments in a multi-agent
coordination domain show that our method improves performance of standard algorithms,
both with and without communication between the agents that occasionally lose control.
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1. Motivation and related work
Our research is motivated by the need for safety in critical systems, which can be put at risk
by rare but significant deviations caused by one or more system components failing or being
compromised in an attack. Innovations in critical systems may introduce vulnerabilities to
such attacks: for example, in smart grids communication channels are needed for distributed
intelligent energy management strategies, while simultaneously forming a potential target
that could compromise safety (Yan et al., 2013).
In this article we present a new approach for learning safe and robust multi-agent policies
in such systems that uses a priori information about the potential nature of the attack or
failure. As such, the algorithm is model free with respect to the environment, and model
based with respect to internal faults of the individual agents. We build on our recent
preliminary work in this direction (Klima et al., 2018) by providing improved empirical
results in a more complex cooperative domain, and by investigating the effect of moving
from centralised learning and execution to a decentralised multi-agent approach based on
fictitious play. The proposed algorithms are safe with respect to temporary loss of control,
and empirically robust with respect to estimation errors of control loss probabilities.
Our work touches upon multiple fields including robust control (Zhou and Doyle, 1998)
and robust learning, security games, safe reinforcement learning and multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning. In relation to the taxonomy of safe reinforcement learning of Garcıa
and Ferna´ndez (2015) our method falls in between Worst-Case Criterion under Parame-
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ter Uncertainty and Risk-Sensitive Reinforcement Learning Based on the Weighted Sum
of Return and Risk, depending on the chosen alternate controller objectives. The domain
of security games has expanded in recent years with many real-world applications (Pita
et al., 2008; Shieh et al., 2012), where the main approach has been computing exact solu-
tions and deriving strong theoretical guarantees, mostly using equilibria concepts such as
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria (Korzhyk et al., 2011; Lou et al., 2017). This has been
very important to theoretically underpin the field, however it often seems difficult to deploy
exact theoretical solution methods in real world settings due to strict model assumptions or
severe simplifications. To overcome some of the weaknesses of these theoretical approaches
we base our approach on reinforcement learning from interactions with the environment,
thus we do not need to know the system model. Until now there has been substantially less
work done on using reinforcement learning for security games compared to the game-
theoretic approaches, exceptions being for example Ruan et al. (2005) and Klima et al.
(2016) who use reinforcement learning in the context of patrolling and illegal rhino poach-
ing problems, respectively. Our work adopts the information asymmetry assumption often
used in Stackelberg Security games (Korzhyk et al., 2011), providing the control transition
model for the leader, and allowing leader-strategy-informed best response strategies by at-
tackers. However, we arrive at a more general safe learning approach where the attacks
might be very rare and not necessarily adversarial (e.g. technical failures). Similar to our
approach is the work of Ciosek and Whiteson (2017) who use a form of importance sampling
to better deal with significant rare events, however their work focuses on a single-agent en-
vironment and requires that the agent actually observes the rare events, while in our case
the agents can reason about these events in advance. Adversarial attack models may draw
on the multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm Minimax-Q (Littman, 1994) for
zero-sum games, which assumes minimisation over the opponent action space. However, in
contrast, we define an attack to minimise over our own action space, and thus learn (but
not enact) simultaneously our optimal policy and the (rare) attacks it is susceptible to.
2. General model
We use the stochastic game formulation defined by a tuple (n, S,A1 . . . An, R1 . . . Rn, T ),
where n is the number of agents, S is the state space, and Ai is the action space of agent
i. The joint action space is A = A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An, and a joint action is a = (a1, a2, . . . , an).1
Ri(s, ai,a−i)→ ri is the reward function of agent i for given state s and joint action a, and
T (s,a)→ s′ is the state transition function. The n agents are assumed to have similar goals
and thus cooperate with each other, with a possibility of any of them being compromised
or to fail causing deviations from the optimal policy. We consider several control domains,
defining whether the agents are in control of their actions or not. During the interaction
with the system there are assumed to be transitions of such control. The model of the
control transition is assumed to be (approximately) known and is defined by the control
transition function C, which can for example define if and when an agent (and which one)
is compromised and thus not in control of her actions. The control function is defined in
a general manner, expressing various scenarios of malfunction or of a malicious attack, as
1. We use the common shorthand a−i to denote the joint action of all agents except agent i, i.e. a−i =
(a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an).
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C(s,a, c)→ c′, where c, c′ ∈ C are the current and next control domain, respectively, with C
being the set of possible control functions. In the proposed reinforcement learning method
the value function then becomes a function of both the state and the control function
as V (s, C). We introduce our algorithm first for a basic case in which all possible control
policies are conditioned on the same reward function (and thus on the same value function).
This is the version used in the remainder of this paper, with a concrete example given in
Section 3. Afterwards we provide a generalisation that relaxes this assumption.
Basic model We assume one of two entities having control: either the (safe-learning)
agent2 with policy pi, or an external (adversarial) entity with policy µ. The control transition
function C determines whether we move between control domains cpi and cµ at any given
moment; thus, in our example C = {cpi, cµ}. The objective of the external policy µ is
defined in a general way and can for example be to minimise value (malicious attack) or to
randomise (random errors). Based on a prior assumption about the nature of µ we want
to learn simultaneously a model of the environment and a model of µ without necessarily
observing actual attacks or failures. This means learning a safe policy pi right from the
start. In the basic case discussed here we define µ in terms of our own Q-value function,
for example an attacker that is minimising our expected return. Thus we need to learn
only one Q-value function Qpi. This is similar to the standard assumption in Stackelberg
games that the attacker is able to fully observe our past actions and thus knows our Q-value
function. We define the Q-value function update, based on standard Q-learning, given the
control transition function C as
Qpi(s, a)← Qpi(s, a) + α [r(s, a) + γV p˜i(s′, C)−Qpi(s, a)] . (1)
Note that where we can normally write V pi(s) =
∑
a pi(s, a)Q
pi(s, a), in our case we have
V p˜i(s, C) =
∑
cσ∈C
p(cσ)
∑
a
σ(s, a)Qpi(s, a), (2)
computed as a weighted sum over all possible control policies σ under C. The composite
policy p˜i represents the actual (stochastic) policy that is executed by the system, including
any potential malfunctions and/or attacks. Note that we can learn Qpi without actually
experiencing any attack or malfunction, based only on prior assumptions about the nature
of C.
General model Here we relax the assumption that all possible control policies σ are
conditioned on the same value function Qpi. Instead, each σ can now be based on a different
Q-value function Qσ. We tackle this generalisation by learning separate Q-functions for both
our target policy pi and any possible not-in-control (e.g. attacker) policy, and then using
a mix of all Q-functions based on the control transition model (e.g. probability of attack)
to evaluate the next state. The value function of Equation 2 now becomes V p˜i(s, C) =∑
cσ∈C p(cσ)V
σ(s), a weighted sum3 of the different value functions learned for all possible
2. For clarity we present a single agent formulation here; an example of our model in a two-agent setting
is given in Section 3.
3. In general this can be any operator, not just the sum (i.e. linear combination), which would allow for
more complex scenarios.
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policies σ. Thus, we want to simultaneously learn Q-functions for all policies σ we consider
(including our own policy pi). We can learn these from the same experience stream 〈s, a, r, s′〉
generated by our behaviour policy pi by using importance sampling4 asQσ(s, a)← Qσ(s, a)+
ασ(a|s)pi(a|s)
[
r(s, a) + γV p˜i(s′, C)−Qσ(s, a)]. This gives us our own estimation of the Q-functions
for all policies σ.
3. Two-agents under severe rare attack
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in a two-agent coordination domain. We
consider two versions of the joint action learning (JAL) approach (Claus and Boutilier,
1998), differing by the level of communication between the agents: (i) full communication
(FC), where the agents can communicate/observe each other’s actions, rewards and policies
and (ii) no communication (NC), where the agents do not communicate but can still model
each other by observing past actions. We assume an intentional and intelligent attack,
which minimises the possible return (minimising the Q-function) as explained above. An
important aspect is the sparsity of such attacks with the aim not to be too cautious when
not needing to be. The risk of attack is assumed to be known to the agents and is expressed
by the probability of attack per state, which is defined by the control transition function
C. In our algorithm we use a parameter κ which expresses the risk of attack and allows the
algorithm to learn an accordingly safe strategy pi. Thus, we consider several control domains
cσ ∈ C, where C = {maxA1 maxA2 Qpi,maxA1 minA2 Qpi,minA1 maxA2 Qpi,minA1 minA2 Qpi}
with p(cσ) = {1 − κ, κ/2, κ/2, 0}, representing the situation where only one agent can be
attacked at a time (with probability κ/2). We use Equation 2 and present an off-policy
algorithm based on standard Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992), and an on-policy
algorithm based on Expected SARSA (van Seijen et al., 2009).
Joint action learners with full communication (JAL-FC) We assume two agents
with different action spaces but an identical reward function and thus a shared joint
action Q-value function. Moreover, the agents can coordinate a priori on a joint ac-
tion to take in the current state, and thus simply find the joint action with the maxi-
mum Q-value. We propose off-policy Q(κ), where we define the optimal joint action as
〈a?1, a?2〉 = arg maxa1∈A1,a2∈A2 Qpi(s, 〈a1, a2〉) and the value function as
V p˜i(s, C) = (1− κ)Qpi(s, 〈a?1, a?2〉) +
κ
2
min
a1∈A1
Qpi(s, 〈a1, a?2〉) +
κ
2
min
a2∈A2
Qpi(s, 〈a?1, a2〉).
Note that for κ = 0 the algorithm is equal to standard Q-learning. We also present an
on-policy version called Expected SARSA(κ), where the value function V p˜i(s, C) with
the attacker reacting to the current stochastic policy pi is defined as
V p˜i(s, C) = (1− κ)Ea?1,a?2∼pi
[
Qpi(s, 〈a?1, a?2〉)
]
+
κ
2
min
a1∈A1
Ea?2∼pi
[
Qpi(s, 〈a1, a?2〉)
]
+
κ
2
min
a2∈A2
Ea?1∼pi
[
Qpi(s, 〈a?1, a2〉)
]
.
Joint action learners with no communication (JAL-NC) Here we assume two
agents without communication, each learning an individual Q-value function. Moreover,
4. Or other similar methods such as Retrace(λ) (Munos et al., 2016).
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the agents can no longer coordinate on a joint action, but can only best-respond to an
estimated policy. We define the algorithm from perspective of agent 1, the algorithm for
agent 2 is analogous. We assume that agent 1 can observe agent 2’s past moves and base
her estimate of agent 2’s policy pˆi2 on fictitious play (FP) (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998).
We choose the most frequently taken action (pure strategy) as the simplest estimate of
the other agent’s policy pˆi.5 Since in this scenario the agents do not necessarily have the
same Q-function, they cannot reason about the other agent being attacked, and thus each
agent considers only an attack on herself in order to compute V p˜i(s, C). We again present
off-policy Q(κ) with the value function
V p˜i(s, C) = (1− κ
2
) max
a1∈A1
Ea?2∼pˆi2 [Q
pi(s, a1, a
?
2)] +
κ
2
min
a1∈A1
Ea?2∼pˆi2
[
Qpi(s, 〈a1, a?2〉)
]
.
The value function of on-policy Expected SARSA(κ) is now defined as
V p˜i(s, C) = (1− κ
2
)Ea?1∼pi1,a?2∼pˆi2
[
Qpi(s, 〈a?1, a?2〉)
]
+
κ
2
min
a1∈A1
Ea?2∼pˆi2
[
Qpi(s, 〈a1, a?2〉)
]
.
4. Experiments
We use a variation of the cliff walking task described by Sutton and Barto (1998) for
experimental evaluation of our proposed algorithms Q(κ) and Expected SARSA(κ). Our
environment is a grid world with puddles which need to be avoided by the joint-learning
agents. The two agents jointly control the movement of a single robot in this puddle world,
with each controlling a single direction 〈up, down〉 or 〈left, right〉. Agent 1 can take the
actions {stay, move down, move up} and agent 2 can choose {stay, move left, move right,
move right by 2}. The joint action is the combination of the two selected actions. We
assume a reward of -1 for every move and -1000 for stepping into a puddle (ending the
episode and returning to the start node). The agents have to move together from the start
node at the top left corner to the goal at the bottom right corner. Figure 1 shows the
policy learned by our proposed algorithm Q(κ) for the scenario JAL-FC. Note how a safer
path (longer, avoiding the puddles) is learned with increasing parameter κ. For κ = 0 our
algorithm degenerates to Q-learning (left panel).
Performance Figure 2 shows the performance of the proposed κ-algorithms against the
standard TD algorithms for an increasing probability of attack. All algorithms use a fixed
exploration rate of  = 0.1 (in training) and are trained for 200000 episodes without attacks
and evaluated over 50000 episodes with attacks. In Figure 2 we can observe the superior
performance of Q(κ) over unmodified Q-learning for both the full communication (JAL-FC)
and the no communication (JAL-NC) scenarios. Similarly, Expected SARSA(κ) performs
at least as good as Expected SARSA, and much better than regular SARSA. The latter is
very unstable in the NC case and often does not reach the goal state (see Appendix A).
Therefore we also include the filtered performance of only the best runs (approximately
best 25%), however this still does not get SARSA’s performance close to the κ algorithms.
We can see that Q(κ) learns a safer path of the same distance as Q-learning, yielding much
5. One could also assume a mixed strategy estimate proportional to the frequency of past moves, or any
other policy estimator.
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Figure 1: The puddle world: Q(κ) learns safer path with increasing κ. Puddles are dark
blue, the arrows show the optimal actions in each state and the heatmap shows
the number of visits to each state ( , blue is none). A learned path is depicted
by stars.
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Figure 2: Total reward per episode for increasing probability of attack. JAL-FC (left) and
JAL-NC (right). The dotted/dashed lines and ‘+’ and ‘x’ markers in respective
colours are the rewards of the learned path (without attacks). The black dotted
line is the reward of the shortest path. The solid lines (with 95% confidence
intervals) are the rewards obtained after training when attacks do happen.
better rewards when attacked (as also shown in Figure 1). Note that we train Q(κ) and
Expected SARSA(κ) with κ equal to the true probability of attack, however both algorithms
are robust against small errors in the expected probability κ as discussed in the following.
Robustness Here we test the robustness of the proposed algorithms. We no longer assume
the probability of attack to be known and thus it is not possible to correctly set the κ
parameter for Q(κ) and Expected SARSA(κ). Note that in our previous experiments we
set the parameter κ to be equal to the actual probability of attack. In Figure 3 we show
the performance of our algorithms for a range of actual attack probabilities (y-axis) while
learning using a fixed parameter κ = 0.01 (left) and fixed κ = 0.1 (right), for the JAC-FC
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scenario; Figure 4 shows the JAL-NC case. One can see that even for the cases where κ
is not equal to the actual probability of attack the proposed κ-algorithms still outperform
the baselines in most cases. This robustness evaluation confirms strong properties of our
proposed algorithms. We conclude that the proposed algorithms are robust to inaccurate
estimates of the probability of attack (within some bounds). In Figure 3 we can see how
Q(κ) for fixed κ = 0.01 outperforms the baselines up to a probability of attack of 0.05, and
for fixed κ = 0.1 it outperforms the baselines from a probability of attack of 0.1 onward.
In Figure 4 for κ = 0.01 we can see that Q(κ) and Expected SARSA(κ) have very similar
performance to Expected SARSA while still clearly beating Q-learning and SARSA. For
κ = 0.1 we can see that Expected SARSA(κ) outperforms all the baselines.
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Figure 3: Robustness: Fixed κ = 0.01 (left) and κ = 0.1 (right) for Q(κ) and Expected
SARSA(κ). Joint learners with full communication (JAL-FC).
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Figure 4: Robustness: Fixed κ = 0.01 (left) and κ = 0.1 (right) for Q(κ) and Expected
SARSA(κ). Joint learners with no communication (JAL-NC).
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5. Discussion and conclusion
We presented a new method based on standard reinforcement learning algorithms which can
learn robust policies in the presence of rare malfunctions or attacks in cooperative multi-
agent systems. While the extended setting of losing control could be seen just as a new
Markov game, we argue that a) this class of games is relevant and useful in applications,
and b) our formulation based on a control loss model provides a solution that exploits the
identical action space of the attacker, which model free approaches applied to the extended
game would not. The proposed framework provides robustness against a chosen stochastic
control transition model, which describes the probability of attack or malfunction of every
part of the studied system. This control transition function is assumed to be a chosen (and
thus known) robustness target set by the system designer, which provides a useful degree of
freedom for many real world domains where expertise is available on the nature of expected
attacks or potential malfunctions that may arise. The preliminary experimental evaluation
in a two-agent grid world domain shows promising results, outperforming standard Q-
learning, SARSA and Expected SARSA algorithms in both full-communication and more
daring no-communication scenarios.
There are several interesting directions for future work. We could assume several agents
being attacked or malfunctioning with different intensity. This would be expressed by a
more complex control transition function with potentially more parameters depending for
example on state or time. A state-dependent control transition function is motivated by
the fact that in practice some states might be critical and more prone to malicious attacks
or malfunction. Such extensions would narrow the reality gap and would allow for learning
more complex policies, where we believe our approach could prove even more competitive.
Our proposed method can be closely linked or even combined with some recent state-of-
the-art reinforcement learning methods. For example, our method could be combined with
Retrace(λ) (Munos et al., 2016) in a multi-step Q-update, which would potentially speed
up convergence. Another promising extension of our model would be to combine it with
Q(σ) (Asis et al., 2018) to allow for mixed multi-step updates. Note that the parameter σ
in this algorithm can also be time- or state-dependent similarly to the potential extensions
of the control transition function in our model. This would allow to learn robust policies
against more complex control transition functions such as multi-step attacks. Another
interesting extension along this line would be to model the control transition function similar
to the options framework (Sutton et al., 1999; Bacon et al., 2017), in which case the alternate
control policies could be seen as “malicious” options over which the agent has no control,
with potentially complex initiation sets and termination conditions. Such extensions would
increase the flexibility of our proposed method, making it applicable to a wide range of
real-world scenarios.
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Appendix A. Instability of SARSA
In the experiments one can notice the unstable performance of SARSA, demonstrated by
very wide confidence intervals (see Figure 2). Therefore, we analyse the convergence prop-
erties of the algorithms (baselines and the proposed κ-versions) by showing the temporal
difference (TD) error over the number of episodes in Figure 5. The figure shows the sum of
the absolute values of the two-agents’ TD errors for both cases, JAL-FC and JAL-NC. No-
tice the different y-axis ranges in Figure 5 for JAL-FC and JAL-NC, meaning that SARSA
is much less stable in JAL-NC than in JAL-FC; however, importantly, it fails to converge
in either case. The reason for SARSA being very unstable is mainly the fixed exploration
rate  = 0.1 and the fact it is an on-policy learning algorithm, which is known to have high
variance. In our model the latter has an even more profound effect due to the extreme
difference in possible rewards caused by the rare but significant events. Furthermore, in our
case additional stochasticity is brought into the model by the occasionally loss of control.
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000
episodes
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
td
 e
rr
o
r
Learning convergence
SARSA
Expected SARSA
Expected SARSA(κ)
Q-learning
Q(κ)
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000
episodes
50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
td
 e
rr
o
r
Learning convergence
SARSA
Expected SARSA
Expected SARSA(κ)
Q-learning
Q(κ)
Figure 5: Temporal difference (TD) error evolution. JAL-FC (left) and JAL-NC (right).
11
